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Abstract
How can we understand the gender logic underpinning the welfare states/systems of East 
Asia? Does the comparative literature, which has largely been concerned with western 
Welfare states, whether in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 
1990), or in gender-based analysis of the male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992, 2001, 
2006), have anything to offer in understanding the gender assumptions underpinning East 
Asian welfare states? Are the welfare systems of East Asian countries distinctive, with 
Confucian assumptions hidden beneath the surface commitment to gender equality? We 
will use the (mainly western) comparative literature, but argue that Confucian influences 
remain important, with strong assumptions of family, market and voluntary sector 
responsibility rather than state responsibility, strong expectations of women’s obligations, 
without compensating rights, a hierarchy of gender and age, and a highly distinctive, 
vertical family structure, in which women are subject to parents-in-law. In rapidly 
changing economies, these social characteristics are changing too. But they still put 
powerful pressures on women to conform to expectations about care, while weakening 
their rights to security and support. Nowhere do welfare states’ promises bring gender 
equality in practice. Even in Scandinavian countries women earn less, care more, and 
have less power than men. We shall compare East Asian countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan 
where possible) with some Western ones, to argue that some major comparative data (e.g. 
OECD) show the extreme situation of women in these countries. Some fine new 
qualitative studies give us a close insight into the experience of mothers, including lone 
and married mothers, which help us to understand how far the gender assumptions of 
welfare states are from Scandinavia’s dual earner model. There are signs of change in 
society as well as in economy, and room for optimism that women’s involvement in 
social movements and academic enquiry may be challenging Confucian gender 
hierarchies.
2Introduction
How can we understand the gender logic underpinning the welfare states/systems of East 
Asia? Does the comparative literature, which has largely been concerned with western 
Welfare states, whether in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 
1990), or in gender-based analysis of the male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992, 2001, 
2006), have anything to offer in understanding the gender assumptions underpinning East 
Asian welfare states? Are the welfare systems of East Asian countries distinctive, with 
Confucian assumptions hidden beneath the surface commitment to gender equality? We 
will use the (mainly western) comparative literature, but argue that Confucian influences 
remain important, with strong assumptions of family, market and voluntary sector 
responsibility rather than state responsibility, strong expectations of women’s obligations, 
without compensating rights, a hierarchy of gender and age, and a highly distinctive, 
vertical family structure, in which women are subject to parents-in-law. In rapidly 
changing economies, these social characteristics are changing too. But they still put 
powerful pressures on younger mothers to conform to expectations about care, while 
weakening their rights to security and support. Nowhere do welfare states’ promises 
bring gender equality in practice. Even in Scandinavian countries women earn less, care 
more, and have less power than men. In the East Asian context a combination of rapid 
economic development with persistent Confucian values puts women under peculiar 
pressures.
We shall compare East Asian countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan where possible) with some 
Western ones, to argue that some major comparative data show the extreme situation of 
women (especially younger women) in these countries. Some fine new qualitative studies 
give us a close insight into the experience of mothers, including lone and married 
mothers, which help us to understand how far the gender assumptions of welfare states 
are from Scandinavia’s dual earner model. Welfare states direct responsibilities towards 
families, families make strong demands on younger women as daughters-in-law, while 
economic development brings them into the labour market as well. If married women 
with children come under particular pressure, the situation of lone mothers in Korea, 
Japan and Taiwan is exceptionally difficult. Lone mothers in Taiwan are described as 
‘permanent family outsiders’ with many obligations for family care, in contrast to lone 
fathers who are ‘permanent family insiders’ with rights to support from their families 
(Lee 2001: 415).
We shall ask about the combination of change and tradition in East Asian welfare states. 
Rapid economic development makes East Asian economies remarkable, as ‘tiger 
economies’ where economic, and political life are bringing a transformation of living 
conditions. These changes bring social benefits too, with women’s life expectancy in 
Japan the highest among OECD countries, and with Korean women’s life expectancy 
increasing at a higher pace than any other OECD country. Political changes bring gender 
equality legislation, which is important for improving women’s rights in employment and 
family law. There are signs of change in society – including gender - as well as in 
economy and polity. Detailed study of women’s experience in practice, particularly as 
mothers in marriage and out of it, shows the persistence of some traditional family 
hierarchies which put younger mothers under unusual pressures, and which could not be 
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social movements and academic enquiry may be challenging Confucian gender 
hierarchies.
Economic and social change
Rapid economic and social changes are a crucial backdrop for understanding East Asian 
welfare states and the changing legislative framework impacting on gender. Korea is one 
of the fastest growing economies, with a growth rate over recent years (1992-2005) 
exceeded only by China, Ireland and India. Economic change brings clear benefits: life 
expectancies are among the highest in the world, with Japanese women expecting to live 
to 85+, while Korea’s women have just higher life expectancy than UK women, despite 
per capita income around 2/3 the UK figure. Japan has nearly the lowest Infant Mortality 
Rate, among the social democratic countries Iceland, Sweden, Norway and Finland, 
while Korea’s is again close to the UK’s, despite Korea’s lower per capita income. These 
are both clear indications of women’s health and show very good records of women’s 
health and life expectancy. Public social expenditure, on the other hand is low –
especially in Korea at 5% of GDP – at the other end of the spectrum from Scandinavian 
countries, and may give rise to doubts about governments’ commitments to the social 
care activities which have tended to define women’s domestic lives and contain their 
public ones (OECD Factbook 2007, online database). For the public expenditure on pre-
primary education (3-6 year olds only), Korea is at the lowest end of the OECD 
distribution. In 2005, Korea spent less than 0.1% of GDP for the early childhood 
education, whilst Norway and Sweden spent over 1% of GDP (OECD 2006:111).
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Policy changes, bringing gender equality legislation, are important. In Japan the Basic 
Law for a Gender-Equal Society in 1999 described a gender-equal society for the first 
time in Japan, and required the state to promote gender participation and gender equality.
The opening article of this law proposes “a ‘gender-free’ society that does not reflect the 
stereotyped division of roles on the basis of gender but rather has as neutral an impact as 
possible on the selection of social activities by men and women as equal partners” (Takao 
2007:153). Japan’s mandatory long-term care insurance started in 2000, bring entitlement 
to those aged 65 and above rights to institutional and community based care, according to 
need, bringing an ‘abrupt shift of gender policy’ (Takao 2007: 154) from earlier 
assumptions about the obligations of daughters-in-law. The government’s perception of a 
need to bring women into employment while increasing the birthrate are seen as crucial 
contributing factors to this change, while women activists have also played a vital role
(Takao 2007). In Korea too, there have been important developments in gender equality 
legislation: since 2001 the Ministry of Gender Equality has been the focus for state 
policy, operating through women’s bureaux, and through legislation: the Gender Equality 
Employment Act, Framework Act on Women’s Development, and Employment 
Insurance Act (Won 2007). These are clearly significant symbolic moments in women’s 
action towards gender equality, but we need to ask about their significance in practice 
under Confucian conditions.
Culture and gender: East Asian culture in transition?
Confucianism has been identified as the main cultural heritage in East Asian countries by 
many western and eastern scholars. Some argue that Confucian traditions, such as 
diligence and hard work, a great emphasis on education, and dutifulness, helped East
Asian countries to achieve rapid economic growth in the first place. However, others 
downplay economic growth in favour of the disadvantages imposed, particularly in 
relation to gender issues. As Palley and Gelb (1992:3) argued, “in traditional Confucian 
societies women were in a disadvantaged position”. The Confucian influence on 
women’s position in society can be best represented with the virtue of three obediences: 
‘to the father, husband and the son’ (Lee 2005a). After marriage, women have to belong 
to families-in-law and become strangers to their natal families (Sung 2003).
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industrialisation, changes in family structure, women’s increasing participation in the 
labour market, and the recent development of equality policies on gender. However, in 
East Asian countries, the tradition and modernity co-exist; the western influence of 
gender equality ideas and traditional Confucian patriarchal family systems are 
intertwined within these societies. As Lee (2005b:166) pointed out in her research on 
women and Korean family, “although the Korean family resembles the nuclear family in 
structure, in terms of the actual activities undertaken within it, the principles of the stem 
family and the extensive influence of the traditional conceptualization of the family have 
not diminished”. Married women are still more responsible for their family-in-laws than 
their own families. In her research, women often felt duty and responsibility to their 
parents-in-law, although they were emotionally closer to their natal families. Women also 
often gave priority to their husbands’ families over their own, while men did not feel the 
same way for their wives’ families. This shows that the Confucian tradition still has 
strong influence on women in Korean families. In Japan, though less strong influence of 
Confucian traditional gender role than Korea, women’s status was often considered as 
secondary in the society and it limited roles for women (Palley and Gelb 1992). In 
Taiwan, it still seems women’s primary roles as carers and domestic workers have not 
substantially changed, despite of the increasing numbers of women entering the labour 
market as wage earners (Wu 2007). While women’s increasing participation in the labour 
market represents the social and cultural changes in East Asia, it is also important to note 
that traditional gender roles still prevail within the family and society in general. In this 
transitional period, East Asian women may encounter conflicts within the family and 
society, as well as within themselves.
Family law and gender equality legislation
The family’s key role in society as a provider of social welfare is common to East Asian 
welfare systems. Welfare systems have been described as ‘productivist’, emphasizing 
economic objectives with strong education and health services to reproduce human 
resources (Holliday 2000, 2005), or Confucian, to emphasize the role of the family in 
welfare and of Confucian values in social harmony. Confucian values may be seen as a 
cover for welfare states pursuing economic growth at the expense of everything else, in 
particular real Confucian values of social solidarity (Chan 2006). While welfare states 
everywhere have a place for family responsibility, East Asian ones draw on Confucian 
values to give families a special responsibility for social welfare.
A Confucian tradition of patri-lineal and patri-local families has influenced family living 
arrangements, with three-generation households, sons expected to live with their parents 
and daughters expected to move away on marriage. Filial piety underpins this, with a 
hierarchy based on gender and generation. While these traditions persist in ideology and 
reality, households are shrinking and becoming less complex. A change towards nuclear 
family living arrangements increases younger women’s ability to make their own 
decisions.
6Family law has protected men’s interests and male dominance in Korea and in Taiwan. In 
Taiwan, rights to property and decision-making were seen under family law as belonging
to male breadwinners, while wives were pressured to leave their families of origin and 
take up their husbands’ domicile. Family law also protected men’s guardianship of 
children after divorce, which made it very difficult for wives to leave unhappy marriages. 
Women have fought for revisions of this legislation and have achieved – by a third round 
of revisions in 2002, parity in decisions over domicile, surname and parental rights, while 
men’s economic dominance in family law has been reduced (Wu 2007: 92-4). Similarly 
in Korean civil law protected the male line and male dominance through the ho-ju 
system. Ho-ju means ‘head of the family’ and men’s rights to be head of the family have 
been protected, through a hierarchy in which – when a ho-ju dies, a male of any 
generation takes precedence over the ho-ju’s wife. Family law changes in 1990 have 
reduced the implications of this, but it is not to be abolished until the end of 2008. Jini 
Kim (2007) found difficult consequences for some of the lone mothers she interviewed:
I learned that divorced mothers become strangers to their children even though they 
are their real and biological mothers. Like me and my child, we are not family but 
simply ‘two-strangers-living-in-the-same-place’ in the (official household registry) 
entry. The council even suspected me as if I had borrowed a young child from 
somewhere in order to get a council house. There was no way to prove I was her 
mother (respondent in Kim 2007: 95-6).
Changing family law in Taiwan (Wu 2007) means that women can contemplate life as 
lone parents in a way their mothers could not. Older mothers stayed with men fearing that 
family law would support their husbands’ right to children over their own:
I know he has been unfaithful and he always ignored the needs of our children and 
our family… but I can’t divorce him. I would lose my children (Nama 56 in Wu 
2007: 206).
Meanwhile Jing described putting pressure on her husband, expressing confidence that 
family law had enhanced her rights to guardianship of their children:
I have told my husband that if he carried on doing nothing to care for our children, I 
would divorce him. I know judges nowadays tend to give the guardianship to the 
mother (Jing 32-year old in Wu 2007: 206).
The different perceptions of these two Taiwanese mothers about their rights to their 
children, their perception of their negotiating power within marriage, and their ability to 
look to divorce and beyond, speak volumes about the extent of social and economic 
change in Taiwan. Divorce is indeed increasing, with 80% more in the early 2000s 
compared with the 1970s (Wu 2007: 85). In crucial respects family law has changed to 
enable mothers to survive divorce and live independently with their children. Changing 
legislation is crucial to underpin mothers’ rights to guardianship of their children and to 
living independently. But we should ask whether Confucian cultural assumptions 
continue to bring gender inequality in East Asian societies, despite the climate of change 
– and political action – which brings legislation for gender equality.
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How can we understand the gender logic underpinning the welfare states/systems of East 
Asia? Does the comparative literature, which has largely been concerned with western 
Welfare states, whether in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 
1990), or in gender-based analysis of the male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992, 2001, 
2006), have anything to offer in understanding the gender assumptions underpinning East 
Asian welfare states? Are the welfare systems of East Asian countries distinctive, with 
Confucian assumptions hidden beneath the surface commitment to gender equality? We 
will argue here that – while there are differences between East Asian welfare states – they 
have some features in common: in particular a hierarchical Confucian model of the 
family, prioritising male breadwinners, which has only recently been challenged by 
feminist movements and gender equality legislation.
The characterization of gender regimes based on the male breadwinner/dual earner 
spectrum (Lewis 1992) puts gender at the centre of comparative analysis and is a starting 
point here. Gender regimes are understood as systems of gender equality or inequality 
through which paid work is connected to unpaid, state services and benefits are delivered 
to individuals or households, costs are allocated, and time is shared between men and 
women in households as well as between households and employment. The decline of the 
male breadwinner model has widespread implications in Western Europe (Creighton 
1999, Lewis 2001a, 2001b). Welfare states are analyzed here in component parts of the 
male breadwinner/dual earner spectrum: paid work, care work, time and power, asking to 
what extent they can be seen as systems of gender equality or as systems of traditional 
gender roles in each of these parts.
We thus use the (mainly western) comparative literature, but argue that Confucian 
influences remain important, with strong assumptions of family, market and voluntary 
sector responsibility rather than state responsibility, strong expectations of women’s 
obligations, without compensating rights, a hierarchy of gender and age, and a highly 
distinctive, vertical family structure, in which women are subject to parents-in-law. In 
rapidly changing economies, these social characteristics are changing too. But they still 
put powerful pressures on women to conform to expectations about care, while 
weakening their rights to security and support. Nowhere do welfare states’ promises 
bring gender equality in practice. Even in Scandinavian countries women earn less, care 
more, and have less power than men. We shall compare East Asian countries (Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan where possible) with some Western ones, to argue that some major 
comparative data (e.g. OECD) show the extreme situation of women in these countries.
We also need to ask about the level and nature of policy intervention. The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990) are relevant to gender, because the Social 
Democratic countries have had gender equality as well as social equality at their heart 
(Ellingsaeter & Leira 2006). Social democratic regimes have also underpinned gender 
equality with social policies, social spending and social commitment to parents and 
8children. Elsewhere, commitment to traditional gender difference or to free markets may 
play a greater role than gender equality.
Are there alternative scenarios for a more gender equal future? The idea of making men’s 
lives more like women’s is at the heart of Nancy Fraser’s Universal Caregiver model, in 
which all employees would be assumed to have care responsibilities, while developments 
in civil society would enable care to be shared (Fraser 1997). But it is argued here that 
gender equality needs more systematic support, beyond the capacity of civil society. The 
French working time model also has something to contribute to thinking about how to 
turn the one and a half earner model into a two x three-quarter one in which men and 
women have time to care as well as to work and to earn. Government commitments to 
gender equality need underpinning with regulation of time and with social investment. 
Comparative data clearly show that Scandinavian social democratic countries are the 
most gender equal: but they have still prioritized women’s employment over men’s care.  
In a model of Universal Citizenship gender equality would go beyond paid employment –
important as that has been – and attend to gender inequalities in care, time and power: 
men’s and women’s obligations to paid work and care as citizens would be underpinned 
by regulation of working time and electoral systems and by social investment in 
citizenship rights.
Work
The gaps between men’s and women’s employment have been falling in most OECD 
countries. Governments have wanted and enabled women’s labour market participation 
for economic reasons, and women themselves have increasingly seen earning as key to 
their independence and security.  Everywhere still – even in Scandinavian countries -
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developed countries of the OECD Japan and Korea have notably high gaps between 
men’s and women’s employment.  Nearly 80% of men are in employment, while for 
women the figures are, Korea 53% and Japan 60% (OECD: 16). In Taiwan the numbers 
of women in the labour market have risen dramatically, from under a million in 1966 to 
4.5 million in 2005, but this is still a participation rate of 47% in 2003 (Wu 2007: 65). 
These figures are below the OECD average, and well below Scandinavian countries, 
Iceland, Norway, Denmark, where women’s participation rates are over 70% (OECD: 
16).
Earnings gaps in Korea and Japan are also strikingly high. Again, women’s earnings are 
below men’s in all OECD countries (on average 15% lower) and in all EU countries 
(again on average15% lower). In Taiwan the pay gap is above this average, at 20% (Wu 
2007: 72). But in Korea and Japan these gaps are around 35% and 40% (OECD: 15).
High pay gaps are among reasons families prioritise men’s employment. In Korea, 
discussing whether fathers might take parental leave, economic reasons were an 
element in the decisions:
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My husband earns quite big money … even if I didn’t work for a year …there 
would be no problem at all (MrsYoon in Won & Pascall 2004: 281-2).
As we shall see they are not the only element, but large pay gaps make it difficult for 
women to press their claims to keeping continuity of employment and developing 
careers.
Despite lower pay, economic needs are prominent among women’s reasons for labour 
market participation:
My family will become very poor, if we only have my husband’s earnings. Raising 
children is really money consuming (May 34-year old in Wu 2007: 148).
But these mothers also saw it as important to play a public role. Yi saw a connection 
between her earning and her negotiating power with her husband. This could be 
paralleled in Western research, though the ‘Obedience’ she describes is a stronger term 
than might be found among Western married women:
I think it’s important for me to have a job. I fear being isolated from society. I 
cannot imagine being out of joint from society. Besides, if I am not working, it 
means I need to ask for money from my husband, and I would probably have to 
obey him completely (Yi 30-year old in Wu 2007: 148).
Employment is indeed a crucial component of security if women can look beyond 
marriage to life with children.
Women’s ability to support themselves independently of partners is less than men’s in 
most countries. In Korea, Japan and Taiwan several factors keep women’s earnings well 
below men’s. The high pay gap, a tendency for participation to dip (more than 
comparable countries) when women become mothers (Won 2004: 273), long 
uncontrolled working hours which make it difficult for mothers to sustain their labour 
market position: all of these limit the extent to which women’s employment brings 
independence. But they are still crucial changes towards more independence and towards 
at least one aspect of gender equality.
Care
Childcare and care for older relatives are key components of gender differences in 
employment and public life. Government strategies to increase women’s employment 
have included socialising childcare, regulating employers to provide leave so that 
mothers can combine childcare and employment, and – much more rarely – encouraging 
a new division of labour so that men’s responsibility for childcare can be supported 
through dedicated ‘Daddy leave’. Women’s increasing labour market participation has 
been widely encouraged, as a solution to economic pressures and family change. But 
while gender differences in care are converging, they are also deeply entrenched 
(Gershuny 2000) and have been much less subject to government policy, even in 
11
Scandinavian countries, where fathers’ responsibility for childcare has been promoted by 
governments.
Comparative data are hard to come by, because national systems are varied. The EU 
plans to increase women’s employment and has established childcare targets, and funded 
research to compare childcare coverage and quality, to measure gaps between the end of 
‘effective parental leave’ and the beginning of school (Plantenga and Siegel 2005). 
OECD data, on which we have drawn here, do not offer comparative data on childcare, 
though most countries have national data on time-use, including unpaid care. OECD data 
do allow us to compare fertility and changes in fertility. These may reflect many different 
pressures, and are not a direct indicator of pressure on mothers’ time, but they may be the 
best we have now to compare these countries. For total fertility, Korea is at the lowest 
end of the OECD distribution, with just over one child, and Japan a little above some 
CEE countries, which have been experiencing extreme economic and social pressures in 
the wake of transition from state socialism. In Taiwan by 2005, the rate was 1.10 (while 
in Hong Kong it has tipped below 1). Korea shows one of the most rapid declines, from 
around 2 in 1970 to just over one in 2004. Norway, Denmark and Sweden have higher 
fertility, while Finland’s has been the most stable over the period from 1970 to 2004. The 
Scandinavian countries are still below replacement threshold, but are stabilising. 
According to Gelb (2003:114), in Japan the rapid decline of birth rate has affected the 
policy changes; in direction to “attempt to reconcile aspects of family and work life”. As 
a 1997 survey in Japan found, most respondents stated that the main reasons for the 
decline of birth rate were the heavy cost of education for children (58.2% of 
respondents), the lack of financial security (50.1%) and the difficulty of raising children 
while continuing work (44.7%) (Foreign Press Centre, 1997:4, in Gelb 2003:114). This 
suggests that very low fertility and very rapid decline could indicate great pressures on 
families in Korea, Japan, Taiwan and other East Asian countries (OECD 2007: 8).
Debates about the relationship between government, NGO, market and family 
responsibility for childcare take place everywhere. Most of these debates are premised on 
the need to sustain mothers’ employment, and say nothing at all about men. Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands are exceptions to this. Iceland has the most developed and 
successful scheme of dedicated Daddy leave (with three months for mothers, three for 
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fathers, and three to share between them) which encourages men to stay at home with 
their children for the three months paid leave to which they are entitled. What debates 
flourish in East Asian countries about who should parent, take leave and responsibility?
The Gender Equal Employment Law (2002) in Taiwan has given rights to parental leave 
for men and women and obliges (in principle) larger employers to provide childcare 
facilities (Wu 2007 for Taiwan).  In Korea the Gender Equality Employment Act was 
revised in 2001, to extend childcare leave to working mothers or fathers to 52 weeks, 
while Infant Care legislation again makes larger employers responsible for childcare 
(Won and Pascall 2004). Also, the maternity leave pay has increased from 250,000 won 
per month in 2001 to 500,000 won (approximately £250) in 2007 (Kim 2007). In Japan, 
economic pressures to bring women into the labour market have brought expansion of the 
Childcare Leave Law in 1999, to include a three-month nursing care leave, which means 
the scheme was expanded to a close relative as well as children, and was renamed as the 
Childcare and Family Leave. In 2005, the law was revised again to allow parents to five 
days of leave a year to care for a sick child (Lambert 2007). Childcare services in Japan
have also improved, as a result of the 1994 Angel plan, which was to tackle low fertility 
through a widened welfare state based social care network. The services offered extended 
hours, infant care, and after-school care programmes. In 1999, the numbers of babies 
admitted to public day care were increased, as the New Angel plan was introduced 
(Gottfried and O’Reilly, 2001; Peng 2001:46, in Gelb 2003:116) .
Although the recent development of family policies indicates the improvement of gender 
equality in East Asian countries, there are still a big gap between the policies and 
practice. For instance, there is evidence from Sook-yeon Won that at least some Korean 
men feel that taking leave for childcare would threaten their jobs and their reputations as 
men:
My employer would respond: why don’t you stay at home forever’ … not only in 
my office, but almost all jobs in Korea…Don’t even think about it’ (Mr Kho)
For us, taking leave for childcare means ‘I want to resign’ (Mr Yang in Won 2004: 
282)
Parental leave is widely available on a gender-neutral basis, and widely taken by women
rather than men. So these male respondents are not unusual in dismissing taking leave to 
care for children. But perhaps they are more vehement than their Western counterparts in 
their negative expression of men’s responsibility for childcare. European Foundation data 
show men and women in Europe with gender-neutral values about childcare even if they 
do not carry it out equally: ‘most people of Europe believe that childcare is basically a 
non-specific task: both mother and father are expected to carry out childrearing’ (Fahey 
and Spéder 2004: 60).
Is the situation of East Asian mothers distinctive? Korean mothers interviewed by Sook-
yeon Won (Won 2004) described childcare as a state of war:
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It’s a sort of war! From 6 in the morning to 11 at night and beyond…What my 
husband does in the morning is going to the toilet and reading a newspaper…he 
usually comes home around midnight (Mrs Byun)
Every single day is a terrible war … I can’t give it up because I have to do it (Mrs 
Lee)
Jessie Wu interviewed mothers of two generations in Taiwan, and found some egalitarian 
households even among the older families. Xiao was a 56-year-old school nurse. Her 
father-in-law took night-shift employment to care for his grandchildren, while her 
mother-in-law established a household in which tasks were shared:
She was also a career woman and she relied on this (housework sharing) to manage 
her dual roles. I benefited. Since I married my husband, four adults in our 
household shared the housework. I like this life style, a sharing style of life. 
Everyone was in charge of something within the household; hence no one had to 
make a sacrifice of his or her career (in Wu 2007: 118-9).
But a Confucian hierarchy, in which parents-in-law have the authority of age and 
generation, can put young mothers under particular pressures:
At the very beginning, I preferred to seek my own mother’s help with childcare, 
because she has a good educational attainment. However, my mother-in-law 
wanted to “keep” her grandchildren around. She has a lot of taboos, as a traditional 
countryside woman, so our childrearing methods and ideas are sometimes in 
contradiction to each other (Yi in Wu 2007).
My mother-in-law has been living with us since we bought this house. However, 
she only helps me to look after my son, not my daughter. She treats the boy much 
better, though both of them are her grandchildren. But what can I do? I cannot 
change the sex of my daughter (Hua in Wu 2007).
If  I were well-to-do enough I probably would not ask for (mother-in-law’) help…I 
would probably enrol my children in a kindergarten to receive education’ (Jing in 
Wu 2007: 153).
While East Asian mothers depend on both mothers-in-law and their own mothers for 
housing and for childcare, some acknowledge that relationships with their own mothers 
are less stressful:
I’m lucky to have such a nice mother who fully supports me, especially in terms of 
childcare. She wants to see me as a successful civil servant … my colleagues whose
mothers-in-law look after their children tend to feel more pressures combining and 
care than those whose mothers support them (Mrs Jin in Won 2004).
In Korea too, childcare was complicated by Confucian relationships between married 
working women and their parents-in-law. Some married working women described 
feeling indebted to parents-in-law, in return for the mother-in-law’s caring role for 
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their children. They saw it as making them responsible for looking after their parents-
in-law in the future:
I feel that I have responsibility for looking after my parent-in-law when they 
are older or unwell, because they are looking after my children now. I think it 
is immoral to abandon them in their old age, after all the caring role they 
played for my children. (Mrs. Wang in Sung’s research in 2007)
However, it was a rather different story when their own mothers were looking after the 
children. One respondent said that her mother looks after her children during 
weekdays, but she still said that she feels more responsible for her parents-in-law. 
When asked why she feels more responsible for her parent-in-laws, rather than her 
own parent, she said:
Because I am a married woman, if I am not married and single, then I can do 
more for my own parent. In my generation, it is still not acceptable to put more 
importance on my own family, when there are things to do for my family-in-
law. … In my family, I have my brothers to look after my parent.
She continued to explain the Korean women’s responsibility for their family-in-law by 
giving examples of her friend. 
I know a case, a case of my friend, her father and father-in-law’s memorial 
service was the same day. Every year she had to go to her father-in-law’s 
memorial service, but couldn’t go to her own father’s, because she has her duty 
as a daughter-in-law (Mrs Seon in Sung’s research in 2007).
This shows the strong influence of Confucian family culture that married women are 
more responsible for their parents-in-law than their own family. More importantly,
asking mothers-in-law for childcare brings indebtedness, with women feeling
responsible for parents-in-law in old age, in a way that does not enter into 
relationships between daughters and their own mothers. This represents strong 
Confucian patriarchal relationships between the daughters-in-law and parents-in-law. 
Mothers also comment on the very small support offered by government. According to 
a doctor interviewed in Taiwan:
The government should be aware that most of the policies in our workplace are not 
put into effect. The regulations are more like decorative ornaments rather than a 
compulsory prescription (Wen in Wu 2007: 215).
I never cherished any illusions concerning the government. Getting any resources 
to help with childcare from the government? This is the last consideration (Yangyi 
in Wu 2007: 213).
In studies of gender in East Asian countries, governments are portrayed as pushing 
responsibility for children and childcare towards the family. Spending is described as a 
very small proportion of government spending and responsibility. Legislation has 
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changed gender inequality and responsibility for childcare in principle, but in practice 
there is little support. East Asian mothers are not alone in this experience of 
governments. In Western countries too, governments have legislated for gender 
equality but failed to provide the means to support it. However, the state of war 
described by these mothers is extreme, and has some distinctive features. Public social 
spending is particularly low, with the Korean government’s 5% at the bottom of this 
OECD league. In Japan, it is often difficult to find day care centres that accept 
children younger than one year. Also, only small numbers of day care centres offer 
extended hours to meet the needs of working parents who often work more than forty 
hours per week (Mainichi Interactive, 2001:2, in Gelb 2003:116). Confucian values 
appear to lurk beneath governments’ powerful sense of family responsibility, and the 
limits to policy implementation in practice. The battle-ground described by mothers
shows distinctive features, as they negotiate with parents- in-law from a position at the 
bottom of the family hierarchy. Some men see themselves as responsible for care. But 
embarrassment about responsibility for ‘women’s issues’ appears to characterize men 
as fathers and as policy makers.
Time
Long working hours are a feature for men and women in East Asia, and a part of the 
climate in which unpaid care work is difficult to manage and difficult to share. 
Recorded working hours in Japan are near the high end of the international spectrum, 
with around 60% of men and nearly 20% of women working more than 45 hours per 
week. Japan also has few part-time workers, either male or female (OECD: 19).
While hours recorded in comparative data are high, there is room to question whether 
– in the long hours culture in East Asia – the real picture is of even longer hours, 
putting pressure on men and women to show commitment through staying at their 
desks. Korean respondents felt pressured to work beyond the legal limit. Male 
respondents described this as putting care out of the question:
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I don’t even think about the legal working hours (8 hours) … But I desperately 
want to leave the office at 8pm (12 hours) … on weekdays I usually leave home at 
7.30 and I’m back around 10 or later…even holidays, sometimes I’m required to 
work…how and when can I take care of them? (Mr Jun in Won 2004: 282).
Meantime, mothers felt squeezed between employers’ expectations and their families’ 
expectations:
The management want us to work harder, even through the night…. Basically I’ve 
tried to… but sometimes I can’t meet their expectation… My mother-in-law really 
hates me to come back late…She can stand until 7 pm, but beyond then, she 
can’t…around 6pm I begin to fret… I watch the time on and on (Mrs Kang in Won: 
2004: 282).
Mothers in Taiwan also felt under pressure because of working hours:
My boss asked me to work 12 hours per working day. The reason that I had to work 
long hours was that he only hired two employees for the shop. When my child was 
four months old, I was shocked to find that he did not like to be held in my arms. 
Rather he liked his grandmother (Nancy in Wu 2007: 150).
There is little part-time work in Taiwan. It’s even rare for public servants like us. I 
want to do a part-time job if it is an available option for me. It’s worthwhile 
working part-time even earning a reduced salary’ (Judy in Wu 2007: 176).
While Judy claims the need for part-time work, she also acknowledges a problem. Not 
everyone could afford to work part-time. Zhang suggests reduced working hours for 
herself:
It would be better for me, if my working hours could be reduced (Zhang in Wu 
2007: 217).
Other problems are clear from the comparative literature:  part-time work often 
marginalizes women in low paid work, and may not bring enough earnings, especially 
in the context of increasingly fragile marriage. It may also affect women’s career 
prospects, if they continued to be part-time workers in the long term.
One Korean female respondent described how her experience of doing part-time work 
in the past disadvantages her situation in the workplace now, in terms of promotion in 
particular.
After I got married my husband went to the US to study, so I had to quit my
job and followed him. At the time, there was no maternity leave or anything. I 
only had 1month leave after having the baby. I came back from the US and 
started as a part-time worker. ……..I don’t expect that I will be promoted. I 
feel that I am far too behind, compared with my colleagues in the same age 
group. I feel that my experience as a worker before marriage and during part-
time work is not counted (Mrs Ann, in Sung’s research in 2007).
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While part-time working can be helpful for women to reconcile paid and unpaid work, 
there are some certain disadvantages as illustrated above. Again, there is much to be said 
for a shorter working week, but if it applies to women or to mothers rather than to men or 
to fathers, then this may bring gender inequality, and high risks for mothers when 
marriages break down. Are there any debates in East Asia about reducing working hours, 
or at least applying existing legislation on working hours? In Europe, too, most policy 
debates have been about making women’s lives more like men’s. Sweden is the most 
gender-equal country, and has achieved this through high social support and spending on 
childcare, underpinning women’s labour market participation in as continuous manner as 
found anywhere. Making men’s lives more like women’s is an alternative, advocated by 
Fraser in advocating a ‘Universal Caregiver’ model, in which both men and women are 
assumed to have care responsibilities and to need time to care (Fraser 1997). The French 
working time model also has something to contribute to thinking about how to find time 
for both men and women to earn and to care. The 35-hour week in France brings more 
gender equality of working time than elsewhere in Western Europe, while allowing time 
for care. Research suggests that both mothers and fathers in France are able to spend 
more time with their children since this legislation (Fagnani & Letablier 2006). There is 
also evidence of preferences for more equal working time, with the current French model 
not far from widespread preferences in Europe (Fagan & Warren 2001).
With the big gender wage gap in East Asian countries, it is still more likely to be women 
who will stop employment or turn to part-time work, rather than men. Traditional gender 
roles may make it difficult to see the Universal Caregiver model or French 35-hour week 
as real possibilities in East Asian countries. But we ask – in the conclusion – whether 
silence about gender inequalities in time, care and power is the better option?
Power
Women’s political representation in most countries is well below the 50% which 
might be expected if power were distributed equally between men and women: Japan 
and Korea are at the far end of the spectrum of OECD countries, with both countries 
well under 15% of parliamentary seats held by women. Taiwan has a complex quota 
system nearly 25% women members (OECD, Matland 2006: 286-289).
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At the opposite end of this spectrum are Sweden, at 45%, with Norway, Finland, 
Denmark following close behind. We might ask why these East Asian countries have 
so little room for women in parliamentary politics, with what implications, and are 
there prospects for increasing this? We would argue that the small minority of women 
in public decision-making positions undermines women’s representation and the 
representation of core issues for women, such as gendered expectations of care. 
Women’s political representation in national parliaments has been shown to relate 
positively to their level of employment, education compared with men, length of time 
since enfranchisement, secularization, social democratic political parties and electoral 
systems based on proportional representation. But even where women’s employment, 
education and mobilization have brought steady improvements in representation, these 
have not brought parity with men. Increasingly women’s low level of political 
representation is being targeted by quotas (Dahlerup 2006, 2007).
Can these low levels of representation in parliamentary politics be understood as 
women’s choices? There may be a case for this in East Asian countries, in the context of 
cultural values encouraging women to be obedient rather than dominant. Accumulated
(Western) research evidence suggests that discriminatory processes are more important
(Philips 1991).  Scandinavian countries have achieved high levels of women’s 
representation through long political work to increase the acceptability of women in 
politics and decrease the acceptability of men’s over-representation. But arguments for 
equality as parity, rather than as equality of opportunity, have brought campaigns for 
quotas, which make a direct assault on discriminatory electoral processes, and hope to 
reduce the time-lag between women’s suffrage and their full representation in 
representative parliaments. In some countries (Rwanda for example) these have lifted 
women’s participation above Sweden’s 45%. There seems a good case for looking at 
these in Europe as well as in East Asia, as a means to bring representation of women, and 
of issues important to women higher up the agenda, rather more quickly than seems 
likely under current political conditions.
Parliamentary politics is only a small part of the political process. The Ministry of 
Gender Equality in Korea, a ‘focal point for gender equality since 2001’ (Won 2007) 
seems an impressive achievement for women, with development and reform of women’s 
bureaux giving a strong impression of attention to gender issues on the part of 
government legislature and bureaucracy. Sook-yeon Won’s qualitative study gives 
fascinating insight into the experience of men and women working in these agencies.
I feel like we’re striving against an enormous tide ‘without backing’: no money, no 
staff, no power. Nevertheless, what we’ve got are complaining, blaming and 
neglect. I’ve worked really hard and have even left my family behind. But these 
days I ask myself, ‘Do I have to work this hard? For what? (Ms F inWon 2007: 
268)
We (civil servants for childcare) can’t go to supervise childcare facilities even once 
in a year because of the lack of human resources. Theoreticallly, it must be 
problematic, but do you have any ‘magical solutions’ under the current situation? 
(Mr C in Won 2007: 269).
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This sense of lack of resources for the task may be echoed everywhere there are social 
policies, whether for gender equality or other objectives. But male and female 
respondents express an acute sense of powerlessness. Male and female respondents also 
express a problem of gender identity for men working in gender equality units, which 
seems to us distinctive. Ms E described male colleagues as ‘continually suffered from 
identity crises’, while Ms H argued: ‘They’re just policymakers concerned with women’s
issues, and therefore nobody asks them to be women. Nevertheless, it seems to me that 
they feel like they have done something they shouldn’t have done as men.’
Mr C expresses this embarrassment about his job as a man concerned with gender issues:
When I was placed here, I received a few words of consolation from my colleagues 
and friends. That was because they thought it was not a proper job to do as a man. 
Frankly, I do care about the way my work is perceived from the outside as well as 
my status inside. It may sound silly, but sometimes, if not always, I’m reluctant to 
give people my business cards (Mr C in Won 2007).
Both men and women found the environment of women’s bureaux difficult to reconcile 
with their personal ambitions and personal lives, and wanted to leave. It is not surprising 
that Won draws a rather negative conclusion about ‘institutionalised powerless’ in Korea: 
‘The potential of the women’s bureaux to protect women’s interests and to achieve 
genuine gender equality through state policy is in serious question’ (Won 2007: 275).
These accounts may not be all there is to say about gender equality in the Korean welfare 
state. But that men could admit such embarrassment does suggest that the ideologies 
underpinning welfare structures in Korea are antithetical to the gender equality which the 
legislation appears to promote. Time may bring Korean women more benefits from their 
gender equality legislation. Perhaps the Korean gender environment is the most extreme, 
and women in other East Asian countries may have more to hope for from legislation 
which puts gender equality on the statute book and into the public domain? OECD data 
show women’s parliamentary representation slightly worse in Japan than in Korea. But 
there have been increasing numbers of female members in the House of Representatives 
in Japan from 1.6 percent in 1985 to 7.3 percent in 2000. The numbers of women 
members in the House of Councilors also increased from 7.7 percent in 1985 to 17.1 
percent in 2000 (PMO 2002, in Kobayashi 2004). Moreover, there is evidence of 
grassroots politics developing in Japan to foster women’s participation in formal politics 
and to sponsor gender equality legislation and issues important to women, such as long-
term care insurance (Takao 2007). It is possible to take an optimistic view of developing 
political processes which have become more open to women through activist groups and 
academic expertise (Peng 2006). But the current picture of East Asian women’s political 
representation and the implementation of gender equality legislation in bureaucratic
settings suggest that Confucian values of gender hierarchy may lurk behind the Ministry 
of Gender Equality as well as behind the unequal representation of women in politics.
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Conclusion
Gender equality legislation in a Confucian context has been in some ways a triumph for 
those who have argued the case and fought for women. A great deal has been achieved.
But systems which sustain gender inequality are complex, as well as underpinned by 
powerful Confucian ideologies. The gender model which depended on different roles 
enhanced men’s power in public life and decision-making as well as private life and 
decision-making. Increasing women’s participation in the labour market is a crucial part 
of increasing their income, security and power in private life and public. But this is to 
address only part of the very complex system which keeps men and women unequal. 
Women will not be able to earn equally unless they have equal time at work as well as 
equal pay. And while they have sole responsibility for care they will struggle to compete 
with men in employment and public decision-making. Is it possible – in a Confucian 
context – to think of policies for more equal care, time and power as well as more equal 
earnings?
Considering the circumstances of East Asian countries, some may well think it is 
unrealistic to imagine an equality which includes men in care, more equal time, and 
more equal power. But unless we can articulate the problem as a problem of men as 
well as a problem of women, we are unlikely to find ways of addressing it that are 
rooted in an understanding of men’s domination of public and private life. As 
Cornelius Grebe argues, drawing on Bacchi (1999), the way that problems are 
conceptualised limits the solutions that can be offered:
If the current discourse of incompatibility as a women’s ‘problem’ were 
replaced by a discourse of incompatibility as a ‘problem’ of male advantage and 
bias in society, policy interventions might be more likely to address the male-
biased organisation of paid employment and men’s behaviour and attitudes 
towards paid employment and care work (Grebe 2007: 315).
So, it may be ‘unrealistic’ to think of solutions involving men, time, care and power 
rather than only women’s employment. But unless we say the unsayable, debates may be 
rather partial, and policy solutions unlikely to reach the roots of gender inequality.
The European evidence is that the social democratic countries, which are built on high 
levels of public spending, and a commitment to gender equality as well as to social 
equality, have been the most successful in supporting women’s position in the labour 
market, with a high quality of provision for children, enabling more equal working time, 
while bringing women into public life and politics. These socio-economic environments 
are also favourable to economic growth and social well-being. Overall there is no 
question that gender equality – while legislated everywhere – has been nearer to 
achievement where governments have a strong ideological commitment to equality, and 
to the spending to underpin it.
The Confucian context is deeply challenging to ideas about gender equality and women’s 
role in public life and decision-making. But there is plenty of evidence of feminist 
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movement, women’s organisations and changes in law and life which would have been 
inconceivable in the middle of the twentieth century. There is room for optimism that 
women’s scholarship and political action can challenge the deeply unequal Confucian 
gender hierarchies.
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